The Phantom Emails

“Congratulations, you’re now an alumnus of our xxx program…” The email arrived one morning. I had indeed applied, hoping for support. Nothing ever followed. Only this message, years later—probably counted somewhere in their success statistics.

A few months earlier, an incubator informed me that I had benefited from a support program. I had been rejected twice at the entry stage. Yet here I was, probably listed in their reports.

These “phantom emails” raise a curious question: if I, who received no support, am still counted as a beneficiary, what might this indicate about how public aid programs are measured?

The Rent-Seeking Economy: A Theoretical Framework

Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor at Yale, has extensively studied how certain economic systems encourage rent-seeking. Her analysis reveals that the more complex and discretionary an administrative system is, the more opportunities it creates to channel resources toward preferential beneficiaries — without any apparent violation of the rules.

She argues that visible dysfunctions are often just the tip of the iceberg. The real issue lies in the subtle allocation mechanisms that consistently favor certain profiles without breaking any explicit law.

A startup aid program has $10 million in funding. On paper, 1,000 companies are supported. Impressive.

But if 900 only received an email and an entry in a database, where did the real resources go?

The Invisible Mechanisms of Filtering

James C. Scott, in his comparative work on political corruption, documented how some systems normalize discretionary distribution. It isn’t necessarily malicious — sometimes it’s just the natural evolution of bureaucracy.

Complexity becomes the first filter. Nuanced eligibility criteria. Sophisticated application processes. Multiple deadlines. This complexity naturally creates two categories: those who know how to navigate the system and those who don’t.

Michael Johnston, in his analysis of “corruption syndromes,” identifies configurations where the same social groups are systematically found on both sides of the table — as applicants and as evaluators. It’s not corruption in the legal sense, but rather a form of institutionalized homophily.
Crony Capitalism

A fascinating paradox emerges in our system. We have what might be called “crony capitalism” — a system that borrows the vocabulary of the free market while practicing a sophisticated, planned distribution of resources.

The actors in this system speak of innovation, disruption, and risk-taking. Yet, look closer: how many have actually risked their own capital? How many live primarily off grants, government contracts, or positions in quasi-public organizations?

Are we dealing with communists disguised as capitalists? The phrase may sound strong, but it captures something essential. The discourse celebrates competition and merit, yet the practice organizes distribution through networks and affiliations.

An entrepreneur self-finances a crowdfunding campaign, creating the illusion of public enthusiasm. With these manufactured “proofs,” he gains direct access to decision-makers, bypasses the process, and even wins an innovation award. Meanwhile, the one who follows the rules is still waiting.

Social Capital as Real Currency

Pierre Bourdieu offered a useful framework with his concept of social capital — those invisible resources tied to networks of relationships. In the context of public aid, this social capital often appears more decisive than the actual economic potential of a project.

The distinction between “knowing” and “being known” is subtle but crucial. One can know the ecosystem without truly being part of it. This unwritten, unofficial membership often determines who accesses real opportunities versus who remains in the statistics.

Systems strive to be inclusive. There are always a few diversity cases highlighted. But do these exceptions confirm the rule — or truly change it?

The Illusion of the Algorithmic Solution

I don’t believe that delegating decisions about who receives aid to artificial intelligence is a viable solution. The idea may sound appealing: an impartial algorithm, free of bias or favoritism. But who programs the algorithm? Who defines the criteria?

AI could simply institutionalize existing biases, giving them a veneer of scientific objectivity. “It’s not us, it’s the algorithm” would become the new excuse.

The real solution is probably more radical: cut the cord. Drastically reduce aid programs. The less public money there is to distribute, the fewer opportunities there are for favoritism.

Why a Francophone Silicon Valley Remains Unlikely

Let’s be realistic. A true Silicon Valley is unlikely to emerge in Francophone Canada — not for lack of talent or creativity, but because the current structures do not naturally foster a genuine innovation ecosystem.

Silicon Valley, despite its many imperfections, still allows a certain permeability for emerging talent and unconventional ideas.

Here, the pathways are more constrained. Familiar names tend to resurface, and established networks often circulate the same opportunities.

This dynamic gives the appearance of entrepreneurial vitality — numerous events, programs, and initiatives — yet the system often functions more as a closed circuit than an open marketplace of ideas.

As long as access to public funding continues to depend more on proximity than on demonstrated potential, our innovation landscape will risk resembling a managed economy of appearances rather than a truly competitive one.

Understanding Without Judging

As an entrepreneur who has never received public aid — here or elsewhere — I may have a particular perspective.

This experience has led me to one conviction: as soon as public money is involved, distribution mechanisms become opaque.

I don’t claim to have all the answers. Perhaps every system of public resource distribution naturally tends toward favoritism. Perhaps the alternative would be worse.

But unless we have an honest conversation about these mechanisms, we will keep receiving emails congratulating us for services never rendered, while the real resources circulate in parallel networks.
The debate remains open. But let’s at least start by acknowledging the reality: our current system doesn’t produce innovation. It produces reports.

This article is published by MCG. We are independent and simply seek to understand complex phenomena.

References

Bourdieu, P. (1980). “Le capital social: notes provisoires,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, Vol. 31, pp. 2–3.
Bourdieu, P. (1979). La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement, Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2016). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (2nd Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scott, J.C. (1972). Comparative Political Corruption, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.